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Abstract  
 
In this paper, we apply a spatial equilibrium growth model (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008) to examine 
relative housing price growth across the provinces and municipalities of mainland China for 
1999-2013. The spatial equilibrium growth model is built upon the traditional static Rosen-
Roback spatial equilibrium model. A distinguishing feature is the addition of a regionally-
varying elasticity of housing supply. A primary finding is the significant geographical 
differences in housing price growth and the importance of differences in regional housing supply 
in explaining the differences in housing price growth. Regions in the East had the most inelastic 
housing supply, while northern regions had the most elastic housing supply. 
 
1. Introduction 
The housing sector in China has undergone significant transformations in first becoming 
privatized with reforms in 1988 and then becoming market-based with the 1998 reforms (Ye et 
al., 2010; Man et al., 2011).  The move to a market-based housing sector was accompanied by 
rapid urbanization and growth of housing supply. Across provinces and municipalities, housing 
prices on average more than tripled. Studies on regional housing markets in China have 
identified numerous determinants of regional and urban housing price increases (e.g., Yu, 2011; 
Hanink et al., 2012; Bian, 2013; Huang, 2014; Wang and Zhang, 2014). Variables identified in 
the studies include availability of credit, construction costs, housing policies, housing price 
bubbles, income, land supply, population, preferences for housing, and tax treatment. 
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Empirically identifying all the factors affecting housing prices is difficult. Some factors 
affect the demand for housing, while others affect housing supply. In this paper, we use a spatial 
equilibrium growth model (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008) to estimate the differences in housing 
supply across mainland China (i.e., excluding Hong Kong and Macao) over the period of 1999 to 
2013. The model separates changes in housing demand arising from shocks to firm and 
household attractiveness from exogenous changes to housing supply. We then examine 
geographic patterns in the differences in housing supply elasticity for the provinces and 
municipalities. We also estimate the proportions of relative housing price changes attributable to 
housing supply differences across China’s regions.  
We briefly discuss the literature on incorporating housing supply into regional growth 
analysis in the next section. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of the model and 
derives the expression for shocks to regional housing supply and the expression for their effects 
on regional housing prices. Section 4 presents and discusses empirical implementation of the 
model for the provinces and municipalities in China. Section 5 discusses the findings of the 
analysis. A primary finding is the significant geographical differences in housing price growth 
and the importance of differences in regional housing supply in explaining the differences in 
housing price growth. Regions in the East had the most inelastic housing supply, while northern 
regions had the most elastic housing supply. Concluding statements are in the final section of the 
paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The spatial equilibrium growth model of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) is an extension of the 
canonical Rosen-Roback spatial equilibrium model (Rosen, 1979, Roback 1982). In the Rosen-
Roback model, land is used by both households and firms, and can be transferred between uses 
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without frictions. Perfect mobility of households and firms equalizes utility and profits across 
space. Therefore, in spatial equilibrium wages and land rents reflect relative location advantages 
for firms and households. Land rents increase (decrease) in response to higher (lower) household 
amenity attractiveness and firm productivity.   
 The spatial equilibrium model has been used extensively to estimate both the regional 
quality of life and the regional quality of the business environment in countries including China 
(Zheng et al., 2014b), Germany (Buettner and Ebertz, 2009), Russia (Berger et al., 2008) and the 
United States (e.g., Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Beeson and Eberts, 1989; Gabriel and 
Rosenthal, 2004). Assuming that spatial equilibrium holds continuously, the effects of changing 
household amenity attractiveness and productivity across regions can be examined (Gabriel et al., 
2003; Partridge et al., 2010). However, Rickman (2014) notes the passive role of the housing 
sector in the traditional spatial equilibrium model, where regionally-uniform elasticities of 
housing supply are assumed and innovations in housing supply are not allowed in spatial 
equilibrium growth analyses. Considerable evidence exists that housing supply elasticities are 
not constant across space (Glaeser et al., 2008). 
Studies then began to incorporate differing elasticities of housing supply within a spatial 
equilibrium model. Glaeser et al. (2006) retain the assumption of spatial equalization of utility 
but do not impose equalization of profits. They then allow the elasticity of housing to vary 
spatially and demonstrate empirically that labor demand shocks have larger housing price effects 
in areas with less elastic housing supply and lower population growth. This can explain why in 
declining U.S. cities there are larger responses in housing prices and lower population outflows 
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005); houses are built more quickly than they depreciate, making 
housing supply relatively inelastic in declining areas. Krupka and Donaldson (2013) likewise 
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expand the Rosen-Roback model such that household amenity attractiveness and firm 
productivity do not solely determine wages and rents. Hence, they impose additional equilibrium 
conditions for the labor and housing markets.    
Glaeser and Tobio (2008) take the spatial equilibrium model one step further by 
incorporating innovations in housing supply. Local areas may enact restrictive housing 
development policies in response to concerns with adverse effects of growth or may be 
especially aggressive in promoting growth through expansive housing supply policies. Therefore, 
the model becomes fairly comprehensive in its ability to account for the various possible sources 
of growth.  
The first use of the model by Glaeser and Tobio (GT) (2008) was to examine the sources 
of growth in the southern region of the United States over the last half of the twentieth century. 
A notable finding of the study was that rather than increased demand by households for natural 
amenities, such as a favorable climate, the most important growth factor in the most recent 
decades was a more favorable housing regulatory environment in southern states that made 
housing supply more elastic.  
Rickman and Rickman (2011) used the theoretical model of GT to assess the changing 
role of natural amenity demand in nonmetropolitan county growth for 1990-2000, while 
accounting for the elasticity of housing supply and labor demand. They found household amenity 
demand as underlying stronger population growth in areas with higher levels of natural amenities. 
However, they found amenities becoming fully capitalized in the most amenity attractive areas, 
which reduced their relative population growth but did not find housing supply to be more 
inelastic in these areas. 
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Rickman and Wang (forthcoming) found that both differences in natural amenities and 
urban agglomeration underpinned U.S. regional growth differences post-2000. However, rather 
than household amenity demand, it was productivity growth that was stronger in areas with high 
levels of natural amenities. And rather than urban agglomeration economies, it was increased 
household amenity attractiveness that underpinned stronger population growth in larger 
metropolitan areas. In contrast to the 1990s, Rickman and Wang found more inelastic housing 
supply in the highest natural amenity areas, particularly nonmetropolitan areas. 
Davidsson and Rickman (2011) used the framework to examine growth differences in 
micropolitan areas across the U.S. from 1990-2000. The most important factor was industry 
composition of the micropolitan areas, in which the GT framework allowed them to detect 
negative household amenity effects for mining and manufacturing employment shares. The 
second most important factor was Census Division effects. Using the growth decomposition 
provided by GT, they assessed the differences across Census Divisions as primarily derived from 
productivity growth differences, followed by amenity demand, with innovations in household 
housing supply the least important.  
3. Deriving Shocks to Regional Housing Supply 
 We closely follow the presentations of the spatial equilibrium model by Glaeser and 
Tobio (2008) and Rickman and Rickman (2011). The model contains two optimizing agents: the 
household and the firm. The household supplies one unit of labor and is assumed completely 
mobile across regions. Subject to a budget constraint, the household consumes a composite 
traded good with a normalized price of unity and housing (𝐻) with price Ph to maximize utility. 
Amenities (𝐴ℎ) serve as a utility shifter across regions. Utility of the household is assumed to be 
represented by the Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-to-scale function, with housing expenditure 
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share α, and is equalized across regions in equilibrium because of perfect household mobility. 
Equalized indirect utility (V0) can be written as: 
 V0= α
α
(1-α)(1-α)AhwPh
-α
                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
The firm produces a nationally traded good, with normalized price equal to unity, 
according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function using labor (𝑁), nationally 
mobile capital (𝐾), and locally fixed capital (𝑍), with input expenditure shares equal to β, γ, and 
(1- β-γ), respectively. In addition, site-specific characteristics cause productivity (𝐴𝑓) to vary 
regionally. Profit maximization yields the following inverse labor demand function: 
                  w = βγ(γ/(1- γ))Af
1/(1-γ)
N
(β+γ-1)/(1-γ)
Z
(1-β-γ)/(1-γ)
                                                                (2) 
Equation (2) stands in contrast to the formulation in the canonical Rosen-Roback static 
spatial equilibrium model. First, land is not used in production of the traded good. So, only 
households are affected by land prices. Second, profits are not constrained to be equal across 
regions. As such, spatial differences in productivity do not directly affect land prices, which they 
do in the traditional spatial equilibrium model. In the traditional spatial equilibrium model, with 
land transferable between residential and firm uses, the assumptions of equalization of utility and 
profits across space are sufficient to derive equilibrium wages and rents and the level of 
population. 
The supply of housing is given by the fixed level of land (𝐿) and housing structure (ℎ) 
on the land. The cost per unit of land is 𝑃𝑙; the cost of housing structure is ξ0ℎ
𝛿 where ξ0 is a 
constant and δ>1. Free entry and zero economic profits are assumed in the housing sector in 
equilibrium. Using the first-order profit maximizing level of h, total housing supply is given as: 
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hL=(ph/ξ0δ)
(1/(δ-1))
. Equating housing demand with housing supply in equilibrium yields the 
following equilibrium expression for housing prices: 
                                ph=((N/L)αw)((δ-1)/ δ )δ(1/δ)ξ0
(1/δ)
                                                              (3)          
The housing market equilibrium condition is required because of the absence of land as an input 
into production and the absence of a firm profit constraint. 
In natural logarithms, the static equilibrium conditions for population (assuming full 
employment), wages and housing prices from the above are as follows (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008; 
Rickman and Rickman, 2011): 
ln(𝑁) = 𝐾𝑁 + (𝛿 + 𝛼 − 𝛼𝛿) ln(𝑨𝑓) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛿 ln(𝑨ℎ) + 𝛼(𝛿 − 1) ln(𝐿))/𝛥             (4) 
ln(𝑤) = 𝐾𝑤 + (𝛿 − 1)𝛼 ln(𝑨𝑓) + (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛿 ln(𝑨ℎ) + 𝛼(𝛿 − 1) ln(𝐿))/𝛥             (5) 
ln(𝑃ℎ) = 𝐾𝐻 + (𝛿 − 1) ln(𝑨𝑓) + 𝛽 ln(𝑨ℎ) − (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) ln(𝐿))/𝛥                                  (6) 
where 𝐾𝑁, 𝐾𝑤 and 𝐾𝐻 are constant terms derived from the solutions and 𝛥 = 𝛿(1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) +
𝛼𝛽(𝛿 − 1).  
Equations (4)-(6) can be used to assess the influence of housing supply elasticity on 
regional outcomes by estimating regressions for the three variables, and include measures of 
shocks that are interacted with proxies for housing supply elasticity (Glaeser et al., 2006). Labor 
demand shocks will increase housing prices more relative to population in areas with less elastic 
housing supply. Other sources of growth can come from increased household amenity 
attractiveness through life cycle factors and increased national income (Graves, 1979; Gyourko 
et al., 2013). 
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To derive corresponding growth equations, unanticipated exogenous shocks to amenity 
demand, firm productivity and housing supply elasticity are added to equations (4) to (6) 
(Rickman and Rickman, 2011). Assuming that the static equilibrium conditions hold between 
periods t and t+1, equations (4) to (6) can be transformed into growth equations:   
ln(𝑁𝑡+1/𝑁 𝑡) = £𝑁 + 𝛥
−1 ((𝛿 + 𝛼 − 𝛼𝛿)𝜆 𝑓 + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛿𝜆 ℎ + 𝛼(𝛿 − 1)𝜆 𝐿  )) 𝑹 + 𝜀𝑁      (7) 
ln(𝑤𝑡+1/𝑤 𝑡) = £𝑊 + 𝛥
−1 ((𝛿 − 1)𝛼𝜆 𝑓 − (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛿𝜆 ℎ + 𝛼(𝛿 − 1)𝜆 𝐿 )) 𝑹 + 𝜀𝑊    (8) 
ln(𝑃ℎ,𝑡+1/𝑃ℎ,𝑡) = £𝐻 + 𝛥
−1 ((𝛿 − 1)(𝜆 𝑓 + 𝛽𝜆 ℎ − (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)𝜆 𝐿) 𝑹 + 𝜀𝐻                         (9) 
where 𝜆 𝑓 , 𝜆 ℎ  and 𝜆 𝐿  are the shocks to firm productivity, household amenity attractiveness and 
land supply common within regional category R. The £ represent shocks common to all regions, 
while the ε represent shocks idiosyncratic to areas.  
Let 𝑩𝑵,𝑩𝑾 and 𝑩𝑯 represent the expressions multiplied by R in Equations (7) to (9), 
respectively. The expressions associated with them can then be solved simultaneously to obtain 
the innovations in productivity, amenity attractiveness and land supply. We focus on deriving the 
innovations to land supply.
1
Various policies are available and have been used to affect regional 
housing supply in China (Ye et al., 2011; He, 2013; Wu, 2015). 
Relative growth in land supply (λL) is obtained as 
                                                         BN+ BW-(δBH/(δ-1))                                        (10)    
                                                             
1 Derivations of shocks to firm productivity and household amenity attractiveness can be found in Glaeser and Tobio 
(2008) and Rickman and Rickman (2011). 
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Strong population and wage growth relative to housing price growth is evidence of greater 
elasticity of land supply. Less elastic supply of land restricts population growth and increases 
housing prices relative to wages.  
To estimate the impacts of the housing price shocks on housing prices we derive the 
multiplier effects of the shocks in Equation (9). A one percent change of land supply causes a 
−(𝛿 − 1)(1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) 𝛥−1 percent change in housing prices.                                            (11)  
4. Empirical Implementation 
4.1 Data 
 According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, China’s administrative 
units are currently based on a three-tier system.
2
 The first tier includes provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government; the second tier includes 
autonomous prefectures, autonomous counties and cities that would compose provinces and 
autonomous regions; the third tier includes townships, ethnic minority townships, and towns that 
would compose counties, autonomous counties and cities. In this paper, the analysis will focus 
on the first tier that includes 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities directly 
under control of the Central Government.
3
 Table 1 presents the areas of study, including their 
classification and region of location in mainland China. 
The regional data we utilize in this paper are all publicly available. Data are obtained 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China for population, wage 
                                                             
2 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China website link is http://english.gov.cn/.  
3 This paper focuses only on mainland China. Thus, the two special administrative regions Hong Kong and Macao 
are excluded. 
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and salary income per capita, and the average regional housing price.
4
 We calculate the average 
annual growth rates for the variables over the period of 1999-2013. 
  According to China Statistical Yearbooks, population in 1999 and 2013 were estimated 
on the sample surveys on population changes that cover about one per thousand of the total 
population of the country. The military personnel were not included in the regional population.  
Housing price refers to average selling price per square meter of commercialized 
residential buildings that are built by real estate companies and traded in the housing market. 
Data are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
Regarding wage and salary income per capita, we can only obtain data for urban and rural areas 
separately. Thus, we use the urbanization ratio, calculated as urban population divided by total 
population, to weight the urban and rural per capita incomes.
5
 For Tibet because of missing data 
in 1999 we calculate the average annual growth rate from 2000-2013.  
4.2 Growth during the Post-Market Reform Era 
 Annual compounded growth rates for housing prices, per capita income and population 
by area of study for the post-market reform period of 1999 to 2013 appear in Table 2. As shown 
in the first column of Table 2, housing prices increased the most in the East. The four 
municipalities under the control of the Central Government experienced the next fastest growth.  
Note that Shanghai is classified as both in the East and as a municipality. The Northeast 
provinces experienced the slowest growth in housing prices. Strongest growth in per capita 
income occurred in the Central areas, followed closely by those in the East and Northwest. 
Municipalities experienced the slowest growth in per capita income. Yet, municipalities also had 
                                                             
4National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China website link is http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/. 
5 The online database for rural and urban population is only available since 2005 and afterwards. Therefore, we 
calculated the 2013 urbanization ratio using rural and urban population. For 1999, we adopted the ratio from  
http://www.doczj.com/doc/886469aad0d233d4b04e6916.html. 
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the fastest growth in population. Slowest growth in population occurred in the Northeast and 
Southwest. 
4.3 Empirical Model 
Equations (7) to (9) are implemented as natural log-differences in population, wages and 
housing costs between years t and t+1:  
ln(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡+1/𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡) = £𝑁 + 𝑩𝑵𝑹 + 𝜀𝑁             (12) 
ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡+1/𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡) = £𝑊 + 𝑩𝑾𝑹 + 𝜀𝑊     (13) 
 ln(ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡+1/ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡) = £𝐻 + 𝑩𝑯𝑹 + 𝜀𝐻         (14) 
where £𝑁, £𝑊  and £𝐻 are constants. 𝑩𝑵, 𝑩𝑾 and 𝑩𝑯 are the coefficient vectors for the binary 
indicator variables to be estimated. 𝜀𝑁, 𝜀𝑊 and 𝜀𝐻 are error terms.  R is the matrix of variables of 
interest to assess housing supply elasticity across mainland China. Included is a vector of binary 
indicator variables representing the geographic region of the province/municipality, and binary 
indicator variables for whether the area is a municipality under direct control of the central 
government and whether a province is autonomous. 
 For Glaeser and Tobio (2008), in the base regressions R represented whether a U.S. 
metropolitan area was located in one of the eleven former confederate states. In Rickman and 
Rickman (2011), R corresponded to a vector of binary variables for the amenity ranking of U.S. 
counties produced by Economic Research Service (ERS) of the United States Department of 
Agriculture. In Rickman and Wang (forthcoming), R represented both binary variables for 
natural amenity attractiveness and binary variables for the area’s position along the rural-urban 
continuum based on the classification by ERS. This allowed for testing the relative importance of 
natural amenities versus urban agglomeration in the growth differences across the United States.
6
  
                                                             
6 In addition to representing binary indicator variables as in the other studies, in Davidsson and Rickman (2011) R 
also represented time varying variables. Such variables included: measures of natural amenities; location in the U.S. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Regression Results 
The results from estimating Equations (12)-(14) with ordinary least squares are shown in 
Table 3. The reported t-statistics reflect heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The Central 
region of China is the omitted category, with its growth reflected in the constant terms. 
As shown in the first column of Table 3, the differences in housing price growth across 
regions of China are statistically significant below the 0.10 based on an F-test. Areas in the East 
experienced over two percent greater annual compounded growth in housing prices than those in 
the Central region. Provinces in the Northeast experienced nearly two percent less annual 
compounded growth. Autonomous provinces as a group, and municipalities as a group, did not 
experience significantly different growth in housing prices. 
The second column of Table 3 shows that collectively the other areas did not experience 
statistically different growth in per capita income. Yet, provinces in the Northeast and 
municipalities experienced nearly two and one-half percent slower per capita income growth. 
Re-estimating the per capita income growth equation after removing all variables other than the 
indictor variables for the Northeast and municipal areas produced a statistically significant 
regression (p=0.056), with each coefficient approximately equal to negative two (not shown).  
This confirms the results for these two regions relative to Central provinces shown in the table. 
Regression results for population growth are shown in the third column of Table 3. 
Population growth exhibits the strongest regional pattern, as evidenced by the highest r-squared 
and largest F-statistic. But only municipalities had statistically different growth than Central 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
rural-urban hierarchy; industry composition; and state and local tax and expenditure variables. Binary variables 
included Census Division, location of a land grant university, and right-to-work status.  
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provinces, where municipalities on average experienced over two percent greater growth per 
year. 
5.1 Housing Price Decomposition Results 
The coefficients from Table 3 are 𝑩𝑵,𝑩𝑾 and 𝑩𝑯 in Equation (10), which produces the 
estimates of λL. The values for λL can then be used with Equation (11) to estimate the elasticity 
of housing supply effects on housing prices. Equations (10) and (11) require parameters for the 
model. For the base case, the following values from Glaeser and Tobio (2008) are specified for 
the model parameters: β=0.3, γ=0.6, α=0.3 and δ alternatively is set equal to 1.5 and 3.0. In 
sensitivity analysis, parameters likely to be more accurate for China are set as β=0.6, γ=0.3, 
α=0.5. 
The first two columns of Table 4 show the differences in housing supply innovations (λL) 
relative to the omitted category, Central China, for δ=1.5 and δ=3.0, respectively. A value of 1.5 
implies an elasticity of price with respect to density of 0.5, while a value of 3.0 implies an 
elasticity of 3 (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008). In column (1), the Northeast provinces are estimated to 
have had the most positive housing supply innovations, followed next by the Northwest. The 
most negative housing supply innovations are estimated to have occurred in the East, followed 
by Municipalities and the Southwest. As shown in column (2), specifying a larger elasticity of 
price to density instead predicts the Northwest and the North to have had the most elastic 
housing supply. The most negative housing supply continues to be the East, followed next by the 
Southwest and then Municipalities. Overall, the results are not much affected by varying the 
elasticity of price to density; primarily it is the ordering among the top four most elastic regions 
that is affected. 
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Negative housing supply innovations can feed speculative price bubbles (Rickman and 
Guettabi, 2015). Thus, the most negative housing supply effects in the East is consistent with the 
evidence reported by Wang and Zhang (2014) that housing prices were higher in several coastal 
cities than suggested by fundamentals such as income and population. Yu (2011) similarly 
reports significant housing price bubbles since 2005 in the eastern cities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Ningbo. 
The third and fifth columns reflect the results of using the estimated innovations with 
Equation (11) to predict the relative change in housing prices from the differences in housing 
supply innovations. Positive (negative) predicted housing price increases in columns (3) and (5) 
reflect negative (positive) housing supply innovations in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The 
fourth and sixth columns are the ratios of the predicted housing price changes in columns (3) and 
(5) to the actual relative changes in housing prices given in column (1) of Table 3. The 
multipliers are the same across regions, so the pattern of differences in predicted effects reflect 
that of the differences in innovations in the first two columns. 
From the fourth column, regions with the largest positive innovations in the first column, 
the Northeast and Northwest, had thirty-seven percent and eighty-two percent of their relative 
changes in housing prices explained by relative housing supply innovations, respectively. The 
East, the region with the most negative housing supply innovations in the first column, had 
seventy-five percent of its relative increase in housing prices explained by its relative negative 
housing supply innovations. Thus, for the East and Northwest regions most of their relative 
changes in housing prices are attributable to differential innovations in housing supply, not 
fundamental demand factors related to the attractiveness of the regions to firms and households. 
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For the large Municipal regions relative negative innovations in housing supply can explain 
nearly all of the actual relative change in housing prices. 
The Southwest, North and Autonomous regions had predicted changes in excess of the 
actual changes. Thus, fundamental forces worked to dampen or offset the relative effects on 
housing prices from housing supply innovations. For the North provinces, housing prices would 
have been lower had it not been for stronger relative fundamental demand forces. For the 
Southwest and Autonomous provinces, negative effects from fundamental demand factors on 
housing prices were in the opposite direction of the increased prices from negative relative 
housing supply innovations. In fact, the negative sign for Autonomous provinces indicate the 
actual relative prices were negative, despite housing supply predicting there to be relative 
positive price increases. 
The results in the sixth column, reflecting δ=3.0, are qualitatively similar to those in the 
fourth column. The only switch in signs occurs for the Northeast provinces, in going from a 
small positive number to barely negative. This suggests that for this region, the significantly 
lower growth in housing prices (from column (1) of Table 3) results almost exclusively from 
relatively lower fundamental demand. 
In sensitivity analysis, Table 5 shows alternative results to those in columns (3)-(6) in 
Table 4. The results are obtained by specifying different factor production shares and household 
expenditure share on housing: α=0.5 and β=0.6, γ=0.3. These reflect greater labor intensity in 
production and a larger expenditure share on housing. Estimated housing supply innovations are 
not affected by these changes (Equation (10)), so the first two columns of Table 4 do not change 
and are not reproduced in Table 5. 
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As shown in Table 5, the pattern of results across the regions holds when assuming the 
alternative values of the model parameters. The signs do not switch because they are determined 
by the estimated innovations. Thus, all the magnitudes are affected proportionately because only 
the multipliers change. The predicted effects on relative housing prices are about 0.65 of the 
Table 4 predicted effects for δ=1.5 and 0.53 of the predicted effects for δ=3.0. Overall, the 
estimated roles of relative innovations in housing supply are still quantitatively significant for 
most regions. A notable change, for example, is that only about one-half, rather than the 
approximately ninety percent in Table 4, of the change in relative housing prices in municipal 
regions is now estimated to have occurred because of relatively negative innovations in housing 
supply.   
6. Conclusion 
In this study we apply a spatial equilibrium growth model to provinces and municipalities 
of mainland China from 1999-2013 to assess the role of differences in housing supply in regional 
differences in housing price growth. Innumerable factors can underlie differences in economic 
fundamentals and housing supply across regions, and the general structure of the spatial 
equilibrium framework can account for them (Ottaviano and Pinelli, 2006; Tabuchi and Thisse, 
2006). For example, the relaxing of hukou restrictions would increase household demand for 
cities with higher amenities, increasing their population growth and housing prices; Zheng et al. 
(2014a) find lower pollution to be more fully capitalized into housing prices in cities with less 
restrictive hukou regulations on labor mobility. Promotion of housing supply such as through 
relaxing housing regulations or public provision of housing (Cao and Keivani, 2014) would 
increase population growth relative to the change in housing prices.  
17 
 
We first find that there were significant geographical differences in housing price growth 
across mainland China during the post-market reform era. We find that relative differences in 
housing supply played major, if not dominant roles, in the differences in housing price growth. 
This is a result that is robust to alternative parameterizations of the spatial equilibrium model. 
While the factors potentially underlying the housing supply differences are numerous and 
difficult to fully identify, the results from the spatial equilibrium growth model highlight the 
important role of housing supply in determining regional housing prices in mainland China.  
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Table 1. Units of Observation 
Province/Municipality Region Municipality Autonomous  
Beijing North Yes No 
Tianjin North Yes No 
Hebei North No No 
Shanxi North No No 
Inner Mongolia North No Yes 
Liaoning Northeast No No 
Jilin Northeast No No 
Heilongjiang Northeast No No 
Shanghai East Yes No 
Jiangsu East No No 
Zhejiang East No No 
Anhui East No No 
Fujian East No No 
Jiangxi East No No 
Shandong East No No 
Henan Central No No 
Hubei Central No No 
Hunan Central No No 
Guangdong Central No No 
Guangxi Central No Yes 
Hainan Central No No 
Chongqing Southwest Yes No 
Sichuan (excluding Chongqing) Southwest No No 
Guizhou Southwest No No 
Yunnan Southwest No No 
Tibet Southwest No Yes 
Shaanxi Northwest No No 
Gansu Northwest No No 
Qinghai Northwest No No 
Ningxia Northwest No Yes 
Xinjiang Northwest No Yes 
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Table 2. Annual Compounded Growth: 1999-2013 
Region 
Classification 
Housing Prices 
%∆ ’99-‘13 
(annual) 
Per Capita Income 
%∆ ’99-‘13 
(annual) 
Population 
%∆ ’99-‘13 
(annual) 
Central 10.90 16.65 0.71 
East 13.29 16.47 1.17 
North 10.97 16.16 1.93 
Northeast 9.12 14.43 0.25 
Northwest 10.16 16.34 0.94 
Southwest 11.21 15.57 0.26 
Autonomous 10.54 15.53 1.06 
Municipality 12.04 14.54 2.76 
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Table 3. Regression Results (robust t-statistics in parentheses) 
Region Classification Housing Prices Income Population 
Constant (Central) 10.91 (14.83)
*
 16.87 (15.99)
*
 0.63 (1.10) 
East 2.29 (2.18)
**
 -0.05 (-0.05) 0.24 (0.37) 
North -0.15 (-0.18) 0.54 (0.40) 0.35 (0.49) 
Northeast -1.80 (-2.08)
**
 -2.44 (-1.85)
***
 -0.38 (-0.66) 
Northwest -0.72 (-0.64) 0.01 (0.01) 0.12 (0.19) 
Southwest 0.20 (0.15) -0.54 (-0.36) -0.89 (-1.13) 
Autonomous -0.10 (-0.11) -1.35 (-0.90) 0.50 (0.87) 
Municipality 0.57 (0.84) -2.45 (-3.12)
*
 2.12 (2.59)
**
 
R-Squared 0.42 0.26 0.50 
F-Statistic 2.42 (p=0.052) 1.18 (p=0.35) 3.26 (p=0.015) 
*significant at or below the 0.01 level;**significant at or below the 0.05 level;***significant at or  
below the 0.01 level 
 
Table 4. Relative Housing Supply Innovations and Effects on Housing Prices: Base Case 
Region Innovation 
(δ=1.5 ) 
Innovation 
(δ=3.0) 
Housing 
Price 
(δ=1.5) 
Predicted/ 
Actual 
Housing 
Price 
(δ=3.0) 
Predicted/ 
Actual 
East -6.68 -3.25 1.71 0.75 1.35 0.59 
North 1.34 1.12 -0.34 2.30 -0.47 3.11 
Northeast 2.60 -0.11 -0.67 0.37 0.05 -0.03 
Northwest 2.28 1.20 -0.58 0.82 -0.50 0.70 
Southwest -2.02 -1.73 0.52 2.65 0.72 3.68 
Autonomous -0.55 -0.70 0.14 -1.38 0.29 -2.87 
Municipality -2.05 -1.19 0.53 0.92 0.50 0.87 
 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis: Predicted Effects on Housing Prices  
Region Housing 
Price (δ=1.5) 
Predicted/ 
Actual  
Housing 
Price (δ=3.0) 
Predicted/ 
Actual 
East 1.12 0.49 0.72 0.32 
North -0.22 1.50 -0.25 1.66 
Northeast -0.43 0.24 0.02 -0.01 
Northwest -0.38 0.53 -0.27 0.37 
Southwest 0.34 1.73 0.38 1.96 
Autonomous 0.09 -0.90 0.16 -1.53 
Municipality 0.34 0.60 0.27 0.46 
 
